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NOTE
RIGHTS OF SURVIVING SPOUSE IN NEW
MEXICO IN PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY DECEDENT
SPOUSE WHILE DOMICILED ELSEWHERE
When married adults move to New Mexico, with the intent to
remain,' a problem arises regarding their marital property rights
that is not presently covered either by existing New Mexico case law
or statute. The problem is particularly acute when the newcomers
are from any of the forty-two states that follow the common law
with regard to marital property rights.' In most of the common
law states, married persons, when predeceased by their spouse, acquire valuable property rights in both real and personal property
acquired either by the decedent spouse during coverture (dower
and curtesy rights) or owned by the decedent spouse at the time of
his death (right to a statutory share). 3 In New Mexico, and in the
other community property states, property acquired by the spouses
during marriage is community property,4 and the surviving spouse
takes at least one-half such property upon the other spouse's death.5
In the common law jurisdictions, the term "separate property"
may be used generically to describe the property owned individually
by one of the spouses. 6 Such property is subject to the other spouse's
marital claims (dower, etc.) when the property-owning spouse
1. That is, become domiciliaries of New Mexico for the purposes of marital property and succession. See Clark, Nev Mexico Community Property Law: The Senate
Interim Committee Report, in Comparative Studies in Community Property Law 81, 99103 (Charmatz & Daggett eds. 1955).
2. Besides New Mexico, ,the current other community property states are Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, Texas, and Washington.
3. See Marsh, Marital Property in Conflict of Laws 1-67 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as Marsh], for a compilation of the rights given surviving spouses by the various states.
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1 (Repl. 1962). See 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community
Property § 66 (1943). Of course, this excludes property acquired by either spouse during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-3-4, -5 (Repl.
1962).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. §29-1-9 (Supp. 1963). If the husband dies intestate, the wife
takes all the community property. Ibid.
6. For example, the wages of a husband in a common law state are his property. He
may have the common law duty of support of his wife and children, but they have no
present interest in the money itself. In the community property state, the wages belong
equally to both spouses, although the husband may have certain powers of management
and control. Clark, Community of Property and the Family in New Mexico 22 (1956)
1 de Funiak, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 66.
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predeceases the other. In the community property states, all property that is not community property is called separate property,7 but
this community-property-state "separate property" differs from common law "separate property" because the community property
spouse has absolutely" no interest in the other spouse's separate
property, present or potentialY With this semantic, but unfortunately crucial, distinction in mind, the conflict of laws problem that can
arise due to the possible methods of treating marital property
rights may now be posed by the following hypothetical :1o
H and W were both domiciled in New York when they were
married. H owned $25,000 in securities when they were married.
Upon H's retirement in 1963, H and W moved to sunny Albuquerque, bringing the $25,000 that H acquired before marriage and another $75,000 that H saved from his earnings during coverture in
New York. They became domiciliaries of New Mexico. H then
dies predeceasing W11 and disinheriting W 12 as to all his property.
The will is probated in New Mexico.' 8 The New Mexico courts
would be faced with the following questions: ( 1) should they treat
the problem as one of marital property rights or of succession? (2)
When question (1) is resolved, should they then apply New York
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-3-4, -5, 57-4-1 (Repl. 1962) ; Clark, op. cit. supra note 6, at
13-14, 16-22.
8. Cf. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-10 (1953), which gives the surviving spouse onefourth of the intestate spouse's separate property.
9. See Brockelbank, Community Property Law of Idaho 304-16 (1962), for an excellent discussion of the differences between "separate property" in a common law
state and in a community property state.
10. For more general works that treat the problems discussed in this note, see
Marsh; Schreter, "Quasi-Community Property" in the Conflict of Laws, 50 Calif. L.
Rev. 206 (1962) ; Abel, Barry, Halsted & Marsh, Rights of a Suriving Spouse in
Property Acquired by a Decedent While Domiciled Outside California, 47 Calif. L.
Rev. 211 (1959) ; 32 J.SB. Cal. 576 (1957) ; Deering, Separate and Community Property and the Conflict of Laws, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 127 (1958).
Throughout this Note the reference will be to the widow's situation, but in most
cases, the remarks will be equally applicable to widowers. The proposed statutory
changes, notes 75 to 78 infra and accompanying text, make no distinction as to which
spouse is the surviving one. Cf. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-1-8, -9 (1953, Supp. 1963).
11. See note 3 supra.
12. A similar situation would arise when the husband dies intestate. When the husband completely disinherits his wife, she takes nothing (there are apparently no provisions in New Mexico allowing either spouse to renounce a will, see note 61 infra),
when the husband dies intestate, she takes one-fourth of the separate property [N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 29-1-10 (1953)]; both of which are, of cou 'se, less than the wife's right to
take one-half the community property on her husband's death. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-9
(Supp. 1963).
13. This fact situation will be referred to throughout the note as the "hypothetical"
situation.
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or New Mexico law to the facts? This Note will attempt to suggest
some of the considerations involved in resolving these problems.
The problem is of particular significance to New Mexicans because the California courts (California being the only state that has
had substantial litigation over the problem) have resolved the
problem by depriving the widow of the rights that she would have
had under the law of the common law state and by also finding that
she is not entitled to any protection under the community property
law which would protect a widow who has always lived in California. 14
California has reached a harsh result, and one perhaps unnecessary
under modern conflict of laws principles, but, nevertheless, the
California decisions must be heeded by New Mexico because many
of our community property laws were copied or patterned after
15
those of California.

THE CALIFORNIA SITUATION AND ITS STATUTORY SOLUTION 16

California is the most populous, and probably the richest, of the
community property states, and, like the rest of them, was relatively
late-settled. These factors have meant that many people moved to
California as married adults, bringing already acquired marital
property with them. 1 7 California courts took the position that property acquired by the husband in a common law state was his separate
14. Schreter, supra note 10, at 207-09. See note 27 infra and cases cited therein.
15. Clark, op. cit. supra note 6, at 13 ; I de Funiak, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 53. See
note 72 infra.
16. Three are statutory provisions in three jurisdictions which seem to reinforce the general rule that marital-property characteristics of property continue unchanged after a change of domicile and transportation of the property
into the new domiciliary jurisdiction. In Louisiana, Arizona, and Texas there
are provisions in the community property statutes that they shall apply to
married persons who remove to those jurisdictions, with respect to 'property
. . . acquired after their arrival,' . . . [La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2401 (West
1952) ] or 'property acquired in this state,' . . . [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-217
(1956) (omission between property and acquired also) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 4627 (1960)]. . . . These provisions seem to indicate that the
marital-property laws of these jurisdictions do not apply to property acquired
in the old domicile and brought with the spouses upon removal.
Marsh 209 n.105. (Emphasis Marsh's.)
Only in California has there been an attempt to change the general rule by
statute, and provide that the law of the new domicile shall govern even with
respect to property acquired while the spouses were domiciled elsewhere.
Marsh 209.
17. See Schreter, supra note 10, at 206.
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property 18 (in the community property sense) and used their succession rules relating to the disposition of California separate property on the death of the husband in distributing this property that
was acquired elsewhere as separate property in the common law
sense.' In the hypothetical situation,20 this meant that W would not
take any part of either the $25,000 acquired before marriage or the
$75,000 acquired during marriage because it was all separate property in the community property sense, giving H complete power to
disinherit W and leaving W no recourse.2 1
In 1917, the California legislature attempted to solve the problem with a statute determining marital property rights for all newcomers, effective when they became domiciled in California. 22 It
declared that all real property situated in California and all personal
property, wherever situated, acquired while domiciled elsewhere
that would not have been the separate property of either spouse 23if
acquired while domiciled in California was community property.
In the hypothetical, 24 W would have then taken one-half of the
$75,000 because it would have been community property, 25 but she
would not have taken any part of the $25,000 because it would
have been H's separate property even if acquired while H was
domiciled in California. 26 The transition of the $75,000 from common law separate property to community property occurred when
H and W became domiciliaries of California, thus creating immediate rights in the marital property, not merely determining succession
rights. In 1934, the Supreme Court of California held this statute to
be invalid as unconstitutionally depriving a husband of a vested
property right without due process of law. 27 Thereafter, the Cali18. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
19. Estate of O'Conner, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1913); Kraemer v. Kraemer,
52 Cal. 302 (1877). See also In re Ball's Estate, 92 Cal. App. 2d 93, 206 P.2d 1111,
1114-15 (1949) ; Schreter, supra note 10, at 206-10, on which this brief summary of the
California history is largely based.
20. See text at p. 374. Assume, of course, that the new domicile of H and W is
California.
21. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 162-63. Cf. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-1-8, -9, 30-1-1 (1953, Supp.
1963).
22. Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 581, § 1.
23. Ibid.
24. See text at p. 374.
25. Cal. Prob. Code § 201; Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 581, § 1.
26. Cal. Civ. Code § 163.
27. Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934). The court noted previous
decisions in which it held that property brought to California from a common law
state did not become community property. Estate of Boselly, 178 Cal. 715, 175 Pac. 4
(1918) ;Estate of Niccolls, 164 Cal. 368, 129 Pac. 278 (1912). Cf. August v. Tillian, 51
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fornia legislature treated the problem solely as one of succession,
rather than marital property rights, and has enacted various statutes
giving the wife rights in the marital property brought into the state
by the husband, but not affecting his inter vivos rights in the property, 18 as the 1917 statute attempted to do. The first such revised
statute only covered personalty.2 9 Under the present California law,
for purposes of succession, the widow is entitled to one-half of
all personal property wherever situated and all real property situated
in this state heretofore or hereafter acquired:
(a) By the decedent while domiciled elsewhere which would have
been the community property of the decedent and the surviving spouse
had the decedent been domiciled in this state at the time of its acquisition; or
(b) In exchange for real or personal property, wherever situated,
acquired other than by gift, devise, bequest or descent by the decedent
during the marriage while domiciled elsewhere.3 0

In the hypothetical, 3 1 this statute would mean that on H's death (W
32
clearly acquiring no rights in the property before that time ), W
would take one-half of the $75,000 that would have been community property if it had been acquired in California,33 but W would
not take any part of the $25,000 because it would have been H's
separate property in California.3 4 Thus, California has satisfactorily resolved the dilemma by statute, protecting the widow by
N.M. 74, 178 P.2d 590 (1947) ; Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010 (1944) ;
In re Faulkner's Estate, 35 N.M. 125, 290 Pac. 801 (1930) ; Strong v. Eakin, 11 N.M.
107, 66 Pac. 539 (1901).
It has been suggested that the Thornton decision holding the 1917 statute unconstitutional was not constitutionally demanded and that marital property rights could properly be reclassified "according to community concepts" when acquired in common law
states by persons who subsequently become domiciliaries of community property states.
Schreter, supra note 10, at 210; Marsh 211.
28. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 831, § 1 (adding Cal. Prob. Code § 201.5) ; Cal. Stat. 1957,
ch. 490, §§ 1-4 (amending Cal. Prob. Code § 201.5 and adding Cal. Prob. Code §§ 201.6.8) ; Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 636, § 22, at 1844 (amending Cal. Prob. Code § 201.5). See
also Schreter, supra note 10; Abel, Barry, Halsted & Marsh, supra note 10; California
Law Revision Comm'n, Recommendation and Study Relating to Rights of Surviving
Spouse in Property Acquired While Domiciled Elsewhere (1956) [hereinafter cited as
1956 California Law Comm'n Study].
29. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 831, § 1. See Marsh 211-12.
30. Cal. Prob. Code § 201.5. See also Cal. Prob. Code §§ 201.6-.8.
31. See text at p. 374.
32. Cal. Civ Code § 163; cf. Cal. Prob. Code § 201.8; note 78 infra and accompanying text.
33. Cal. Civ. Code § 164.
34. Cal. Civ. Code § 163.
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giving all widows essentially the rights that a life-long California
domiciliary who becomes a widow would have.
II
PROFESSOR MARSH'S ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION 8 5

Professor Marsh states that it is established that, unless there is
some statutory authority such as California has provided, the
widow cannot claim any interest as a community interest in property
acquired by the husband while domiciled in a common law state and
then brought into a community property state. 6 However, suppose
in the hypothetical8 7 that W proves the law of New York would
have given her a claim to a one-half interest in the property held
by her husband at his death, and she claims that she is entitled to
this one-half of the property acquired while the couple was domiciled in New York. Professor Marsh would resolve the case as
follows:
Her claim to a share of the . . . [holdings] of the husband free
from his attempted testamentary disposition . . . [would be] charac-

terized as an issue of marital property by the community property
state, and the choice-of-law rule refers the court to the law of the first
domicile as the governing law. By that law, she . . . [would be]
entitled to . . . [one-half] of the husband's . . . [holdings at

death] despite his attempt to bequeath the property to a third person.
Therefore, it would seem that, by applying this law, the wife should
prevail.8 9

Thus, in the hypothetical,40 W would take one-half of the entire
$100,000 that H held at his death because that is what she would
35. The most comprehensive, and probably the best, reference in the conflict of laws
in the marital property area is Marsh, Marital Property in Conflict of Laws, op. cit.
supra note 10. Professor Marsh also was research consultant for the California Law
Revision Commission when they suggested amendments to the California law in 1956
and 1960. See 1956 California Law Comm'n Study; California Law Revision Comm'n,
Recommendation and Study Relating to Inter Vivos Marital Property Rights in Property Acquired While Domiciled Elsewhere (1960).
36. Marsh 227, citing many cases in his note 9, including Estate of Thornton, 1
Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
37. See text at p. 374. The New York law referred to is only an assumption for
purposes of this discussion.
38. Marsh 232-33.
39. Id. at 228. (Emphasis added.)
40. See text at p. 374.
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have taken if the couple had remained in New York, New York being the governing law.
Professor Marsh notes that two objections might be raised
against this solution. The first is the different characterization of the
problem used by the two states involved. Under Professor Marsh's
analysis, the community property state, for the purposes of its conflicts rule, characterizes the problem as one of "marital property."
However, the common law state has classified its law relating to the
property rights of a surviving spouse as a rule of "succession."
Thus, the common law state would have no internal law relating to
"marital property" rights of a surviving spouse, and, thus, no appropriate law for the community-property-state court to apply to
the problem." Second, he suggests that a renvoi problem could
result. The forum community property state has characterized the
problem as one of marital property and thus refers to the domicile
of the decedent at the time of acquisition of the property to determine its status. But if the court also refers to the common law state's
conflict of laws rules, then the court would in turn refer to the law
of the domicile at the decedent's death as the proper law to be used
for succession. If the community property state rejected the renvoi,
it could use Professor Marsh's solution and apply the common law
state's rules of succession ;42 but if the community property state accepted the renvoi, it probably would apply its law of succession and
probably find separate property in the community sense, leaving the
wife with nothing. He rejects these arguments as not grounded by
"any reason in policy or logic,"' 4 3 and states that "it seems doubtful
that a mere change of domicile should be held to alter the respective
interests of the spouses in property, in the absence of some special
reason, and none suggests itself here." 4 However, he does observe
that the California courts have refused to apply his reasoning and
have held that the wife is not entitled to protection under either the
community property or common law system. 4 "Such a result is
clearly both illogical and unjust, and a correct analysis of the problem does not support it." 46
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Marsh 228.
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 229-33.
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III

HOW SHOULD NEW MEXICO HANDLE THIS PROBLEM?

There are apparently no cases in New Mexico in which the wife
has been completely disinherited on her husband's death. Because
New Mexico's community property laws are substantially the same
as California's were before the California legislature enacted their
statutory solution,47 indicating that the newcomer New Mexico wife
could be effectively disinherited, some reflection on how New Mexico should face the problem, if it arises, is appropriate. If the problem should arise, and assuming that no statutory guides are provided by the legislature, the New Mexico Supreme Court can do
either as the pre-1935 California courts did and find that a wife in
W's position4 has no protection under either the common law or
community property systems, or it can use Professor Marsh's
reasoning to give the wife the rights she would have had if she had
stayed in the common law jurisdiction. 4 However, the New Mexico
legislature could save the court from making the decision by enacting a statute similar to California's Probate Code section 201.5,0
which protects the widow's succession rights by application of community property concepts. 51
One can attempt to determine whether it would be possible for
the New Mexico Supreme Court to reach a satisfactory solution
on the basis of New Mexico precedent, without having to follow
the California cases. This would seem justified, as surely the California court's decision to deprive the widow of any protection need
not bind our court, thereby causing it to do something that would
seem to be against any conceivable public policy. 52 Nevertheless, it
is more realistic to accept the proposition that the California court's
holding will be of sufficient influence to induce our court to hold
47. Compare N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 10 [now, as amended, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 574-1 (Repl. 1962)], vith Cal. Stat. 1897, ch. 72, § 1 [now, as amended, Cal. Civ. Code
§ 164]. They are virtually identical. See note 28 supra and accompanying text for the
California solution.
48. See text at p. 374.
49. Or the court could conceivably give the wife community property rights saying
that due process so requires, see note 27 supra. Contra, Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal. 2d
1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
50. See also Cal. Prob. Code §§ 201.6-.8.
51. See Professor Clark's warning, in note 74 infra, about piecemeal legislative
changes in the community property area.
52. Marsh 231-32. See also Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 39 N.M. 256, 265, 45
P.2d 927, 932 (1935): "When a court is called upon to recognize foreign law, it is
bound to consider domestic public policy."
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similarly. This leads to the conclusion that a statute based on the
California experience should be offered in case the New Mexico
legislature is inclined to insure that widows are not denied what is
surely their due under both the English common law concept of
dower, as refined in the statutory share, and the Spanish-Mexican
civil law concept of community of property.
A. Could New Mexico Apply ProfessorMarsh's Reasoning and
Give the Widow the Rights She Had in Her FormerDomicile?
The widow would be entitled to whatever share in the husband's
property that she would have been entitled if he had died domiciled
in the state in which the property was acquired. The claim would
be characterized as one of marital property by the New Mexico
court, and, by a choice of law rule, the court would refer to the law
of the domicile at the time the property was acquired as the governing law. 53 Of course, there is the practical problem that the law of
any of the other forty-nine states may have to be referred to in any
given case, but this objection would seem superfluous when compared to the alternative of allowing a widow to be disinherited.
In In re Faulkner'sEstate, 4 the decedent had come to New Mexico in 1907 with his second wife and children and purchased a farm
near Dexter for about $20,000, the proceeds of a sale of separate
property owned by him in Illinois. The trial court had found that the
farm was community property,5 5 thus going to the second wife and
all the children ;56 the plaintiffs contended that the farm was separate
property, and thus, they, as children of the former marriage, would
have a claim to a larger interest in the property." The Supreme
Court of New Mexico reversed the trial court,5" finding that there
53. Marsh 228-29. And, of course, the court would ignore how the internal law is
classified in the common law state (i.e., marital property or succession), but would use
the law of the common law state that would give the widow the appropriate interest in
the decedent spouse's property. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
54. 35 N.M. 125, 290 Pac. 801 (1930).
55. Id. at 126, 290 Pac. at 801. One must keep in mind that in a community property
state, there is always the presumption that any given property is community property.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1 (Repl. 1962). The burden is always on the person alleging
that property is separate to so prove it. Of course, the assumption throughout this note
is that the property has been shown to be separate. The distinction between the community and common law separate property also must be kept in mind.
56. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 27 [now, as amended, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-9 (Supp.
1963)].

57. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-10 (1953).
58. In re Faulkner's Estate, 35 N.M. 125, 128, 290 Pac. 801, 802 (1930).
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was sufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presumption of
community property. 59
If the decedent in Faulkner had attempted to completely disinherit his second wife, 60 the supreme court decision would have resulted in her taking nothing, the property going to whomever the
decedent named in his will, as opposed to her taking the one-third
to which she would have been entitled in Illinois by renouncing his

will and taking her statutory share. 6' If the decedent had died
intestate, the supreme court's finding would have resulted in the
wife taking one-quarter of the property, rather than the five-eighths
that she would have taken if the property had been found to be
community.6 2 The court's decision also would have meant that the
decedent's children would have split the remaining three-quarters of
the farm, rather than dividing among themselves the remaining
three-eighths of the farm, as they would have done if the property
had been found to be community. 3 Thus, assuming Illinois law
provides that the wife had dower rights to one-third of her husband's holdings at his death, the supreme court decision resulted in
the wife taking only one-fourth of the property (because it was
classified as New Mexico separate property), rather than the onethird that she would have taken if it had been classified as Illinois
separate property.
The court did not consider the fact that by classifying the property as separate property that perhaps it should retain its characteristics as Illinois-acquired separate property.6 4 The Supreme Court

59. Id. at 127-28, 290 Pac. at 801-02; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1 (Repl. 1962). See
also Clark, Presumptions in New Mexico Community Property Law: The California
Influence, 25 So. Cal. L. Rev. 149 (1952).
60. As in the hypothetical situation, see text at p. 374. The Faulkner opinion does
not disclose whether the decedent died testate or intestate. That fact did not affect the
issue with which the court was concerned. The assumptions in the text are made merely
for purposes of discussion in the Note.
61. There seems to be no provision allowing a wife in New Mexico to renounce
her husband's will. Even if she could, she would only take the one-quarter of the
separate property under the intestacy law rather than the one-half that the New Mexico
widow can claim of the community property, regardless of the testator's action. N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 29-1-9, -10 (1953, Supp. 1963). See Dillard v. New Mexico State Tax
Comm'n, 53 N.M. 12, 201 P.2d 345 (1948) ; but see Poldervaart, New Mexico Probate
Manual 86 (1961).
The Illinois law referred to is only an assumption for purposes of discussion.
62. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, §27; N.M. Stat. Ann. §29-1-10 (1953). N.M. Laws
1907, ch. 37, § 27 was amended by N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 147, § 1 and N.M. Laws 1961,
ch. 12, § 1, and is now N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-9 (Supp. 1963).
63. Ibid.
64. See Brockelbank, Community Property Law of Idaho 304-16 (1962).
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of New Mexico has held uniformly that "it is the status of the
property at the time of its acquisition that determines whether it is
separate or community property. ' '6 5 Unfortunatley, this must mean
that when the property originally acquired its status as separate
property in Illinois, it had certain attributes, including a certain
interest of the wife if she should outlive her husband; but if the
same property (or exchanged property) is brought to New Mexico,
it loses those attributes and becomes separate property in the community sense. 6 There seems to be no reason other than the California precedent that should cause New Mexico to deny the widow
the benefits of the separate property's attributes from the former
domicile."' However, the reasonable conclusion from an analysis of
In re Faulkner'sEstate and the California decisions is that the New
Mexico court would classify such property as separate property in
the community sense. To avoid a manifest injustice to widows in
such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the legislature to consider
enacting a statutory remedy to the problem.
B. ProposedStatutory Solution for New Mexico
68
The landmark California case is In re O'Conner's Estate.
O'Conner was married in Indiana, bringing $200,000 of securities
into the marriage. A few days later he moved to California, became
domiciled, and died there while seeking a divorce. O'Conner's widow
claimed one-third interest in his property as her statutory share
under Indiana law. The court merely said that the decedent was
domiciled in California at the time of his death, and, therefore, California's law of descent and distribution applied. 9 As a result of the

65. August v. Tillian, 51 N.M. 74, 77, 178 P.2d 590, 592 (1947). See also Laughlin
v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010 (1944).
66. But see Marsh 233.
67. In re O'Conner's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933) ; Marsh 229-30. See
note 40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of how the O'Conner case would
affect the hypothetical situation.
68. Ibid. See also Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302 (1877).
69. Ibid.
It is possible to explain this case on the basis that the California court accepted the renvoi and applied California law. The wife would not have had a
nonbarrable interest in this property had it been acquired before marriage.
[Accord, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3-5 (Repl. 1962).] However, the court does
not refer to the choice-of-law rules of Indiana at all. And although the court
says at one point that 'Appellant concedes that the property in question if governed by the California law would be the separate property of decedent and
subject to his testamentary disposition,' . . . [23 P.2d at 1033] the opinion as
a whole seems to proceed on the theory that a wife would not have a nonbar-
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O'Conner case, the California legislature enacted section 201.5 of
the Probate Code, giving the wife one-half of the property that
would have been community property if it had been acquired in
California. 70 "Had the O'Conner case been correctly decided, section 201.5 would probably have been unnecessary "' 71 in California,
and, ipso facto, unnecessary in New Mexico.
Since the New Mexico Supreme Court will probably feel compelled to follow the California decisions, 7 2 it is suggested that our
legislature should enact statutes similar to those of California to
protect the widow's interest. This is probably the more reasonable
solution (when compared to the Marsh solution 71) in light of the
fact that it makes the marital property rights uniform for all widows
in New Mexico, rather than having one law for life-long residents
who become widows and forty-nine additional-and different-laws
applicable for those who come to New Mexico married to a spouse
who acquired property while domiciled elsewhere.
One must be mindful of Professor Clark's warning on hasty
rable interest in any property brought by a husband from a common-law state,
whether acquired before or after marriage. The opinion completely fails to
justify such a rule, however. The court says: 'The mere fact that under the
Indiana laws . . . the power of the husband to dispose of his personal property by will was subject to the right of his wife at her election to claim a third
thereof gave her no more than an expectancy in this portion of his estate ...
Such a limitation of the husband's right would give the wife no interest in his
property during his lifetime. [But WVis not here asserting any interest during
his lifetime, but after his death.] We are satisfied that appellant had no
present fixed right or interest in decedent's personal estate, or more than a
mere expectancy, which depended upon survivorship to become a vested right.
[But W has survived H in this case.] This being true, and he having established his domicile in California, . . . the property was subject to the law of
this state, which governs its disposition and distribution whether he died testate or intestate.' . . . [23 P.2d at 1034]. It is apparent that the first two
statements have no application to this case, whatever may be their abstract
validity, and that the final statement is a mere announcement of the result
and not a reason for it.
Marsh 230-31, quoting from In re O'Conner's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031, 1033-34
(1933).
70. Marsh 231.
71. Ibid. This is because the wife would either have her community property rights
or the rights provided by the state where the property was acquired. While these
rights from elsewhere might be less than those provided under § 201.5, still she would
be offered some protection and the California legislature may not have felt compelled
to enact § 201.5.
72. 1956 California Law Comm'n Study E-17 n.8: "Although the result of this case
[In re O'Conner's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933)] has been criticized by the
author elsewhere, . . . [Marsh 228-33], there is no doubt that it represents the present
law of California and probably of the other community property states."
73. See section II of this Note, supra at p. 378.
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statutory amendments in the community property area,7 4 but the
California experiences should allow New Mexico to avoid the possible pitfalls.
The following statutes are proposed for the perusal of the next
New Mexico legislature:
AN ACT
RELATING TO DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION;
ENACTING SECTIONS 29-1-9.5, -9.6, -9.7, AND -9.8
NEW MEXICO STATUTES ANNOTATED.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO:
Section 1. A new Section 29-1-9.5 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation is enacted to read:
"29-1-9.5. Death of spouse-Property acquired while domiciled
out of state or in exchange therefor-Surviving spouse's shareDisposition of other share.-Upon the death of any married person
domiciled in this State one-half of the following property in his
estate shall belong to the surviving spouse and the other one-half of
such property is subject to the testamentary disposition of the
decedent, and in the absence thereof goes to the surviving spouse:
all personal property wherever situated and all real property situated in this State heretofore and hereafter acquired:
(a) By the decedent while domiciled elsewhere which would
have been the community property of the decedent and the surviving
spouse had the decedent been domiciled in this State at the time of
its acquisition; or
(b) In exchange for real or personal property, wherever situated, acquired other than by gift, devise, bequest or descent by the
decedent during the marriage while domiciled elsewhere.
All such property is subject to the debts of the decedent, community debts, funeral expenses of the decedent, the family allowance
and the charge and expenses of administration.
74. Clark, New Mexico Community Property La'w: The Senate Interim Committee
Report, in Comparative Studies in Community Property Law 81, 104 (Charmatz &
Daggett eds. 1955): "Piecemeal legislation has not always. brought about the desired
changes without also, in many cases, creating complications larger than those it attempts to correct." See also Wood, Community Property Law of New Mexico (New
Mexico Senate Interim Committee on Community Property, Twenty-First Legislature,
1954), which does not discuss any conflict of laws problems.
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As used in this section personal property does not include and real
property does include leasehold interests in real property." 75
Section 2. A new Section 29-1-9.6 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation is enacted to read:
"29-1-9.6. Death of non-domiciliary spouse leaving will disposing
of non-community realty in state-Election of surviving spouse.Upon the death of any married person not domiciled in this State
who leaves a valid will disposing of real property in this State which
is not the community property of the decedent and the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse has the same right to elect to take a
portion of or interest in such property against the will of the decedent as though the property were situated in the decedent's domicile
at death. As used in this section real property includes leasehold
1 76
interests in real property.

Section 3. A new Section 29-1-9.7 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation is enacted to read:
"29-1-9.7. Election of surviving spouse to take under or against
will.-Whenever a decedent had made provision by a valid will for
the surviving spouse and the spouse also has a right under Section
29-1-9.5 of this chapter to take property of the decedent against the
will, the surviving spouse shall be required to elect whether to take
under the will or to take against the will unless it appears by the
will that the testator intended that the surviving spouse might take
both under the will and against it."

7

Section 4. A new Section 29-1-9.8 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation is enacted to read:
"29-1-9.8. Restoration of decedent's estate of property in which
surviving spouse had expectancy.-Whenever any married person
dies domiciled in this State who has made a transfer to a person
other than the surviving spouse, without receiving in exchange a
consideration of substantial value, of property in which the surviv75. See Cal. Prob. Code § 201.5. See also Swihart, Federal Taxation of New Mexico
Community Property, 9 Natural Resources J. 104, 168-69 (1963). Professor Swihart
urges that the New Mexico legislature give the wife testamentary power over one-half
the community property. This would not affect the statutes proposed here, but his
article should be examined by anyone concerned with the area.
76. See Cal. Prob. Code § 201.6. The proposed §§ 29-1-9.6 to -.8 have not been discussed in this Note, but would be desirable companion sections to the proposed § 29-1-9.5.
For a complete discussion of the necessity and purposes of §§ 29-1-9.6 to -.8, see Abel,
Barry, Halsted & Marsh, Rights of a Surv.i'ving Spouse in Property Acquired by a
Decedent While Domiciled Outside California, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 211, 216-31 (1959);
1956 California Law Study Comm'n E-7 to E-8, E-12 to E-13, E-27 to E-31.
77. See Cal. Prob. Code § 201.7; note 76 supra.
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ing spouse had an expectancy under Section 29-1-9.5 of this chapter
at the time of such transfer, the surviving spouse may require the
transferee to restore to the decedent's estate one-half of such property, its value, or its proceeds, if the decedent had a substantial quantum of ownership or control of the property at death. If the
decedent has provided for the surviving spouse by will, however, the
spouse cannot require such restoration unless the spouse had made
an irrevocable election to take against the will under Section 291-9.5 of this chapter rather than to take under the will. All property
restored to the decedent's estate hereunder shall go to the surviving
spouse pursuant to Section 29-1-9.5 of this chapter as though such
transfer had not been made." 7 8
CONCLUSION

It is evident that the marital property rights of surviving spouses
of couples that have moved to New Mexico during their adult life
may be lost or reduced because of the move. This is clearly contrary
to the philosophy of both the common and civil law, but has been
merely an unfortunate outgrowth of the increasing contact of the
two systems of family law. Thus, the proposed sections 29-1-9.5 to
-.8 should be enacted by the New Mexico legislature to clear this
confusion and provide surviving spouses the protection needed in
our mobile society.
ROBERT J. WERNER*

78. See Cal. Prob. Code § 201.8; note 76 rupra. See notes 31 to 34 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of how these proposed statutes would affect the hypothetical situation.
*Member, Board of Editors, 1964-65. Member of the New Mexico Bar.

